Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics and Consequentialism by Singleton, J.
Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics and Consequentialism  
 
Introduction
Contemporary theories of Virtue Ethics are often presented as theories that are in 
opposition to Kantian Ethics and Consequentialist Ethics. One reason that is 
commonly put forward to justify this opposition is that they take different moral 
questions to be the central or fundamental moral question. Virtue ethics takes 
character to be at the centre of morality making the fundamental moral question, 
“What sort of character would the virtuous person have?” On the other hand, it would 
appear that Consequentialist Ethics and Kantian Ethics take as primary the question, 
“What makes an action right?” 
 
Stating the opposition in this way still leaves the precise nature of the opposition 
unclear. Assuming that it is correct to suppose that they locate the central moral 
questions in different areas leaves it an open question whether or not the opposing 
theories provide an answer to the questions that they do not take to be fundamental. Is 
there an answer within Virtue Ethics to the question, “What makes an action right” 
and within Consequentialist  and Kantian Ethics to the question , “What sort of 
character would the virtuous person have?”   
 
However, it might be claimed that none of these theories are able to answer both 
questions. Robert Louden argues for the claim “that we need to begin efforts to co-
ordinate irreducible or strong notions of virtue along with irreducible or strong 
conceptions of the various act notions into our conceptual scheme of morality”i  The 
idea then would be that we do not have Virtue Ethics necessarily in competition with 
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Kantian Ethics and Consequentialist Ethics. Rather, some sort of combination of 
theories dealing with the questions of what character a virtuous person would have 
and what makes an action right could be proposed. 
 
In a recent book covering all three of these approaches, Marcia Baron claims, “it is 
difficult to see what all three are theories of. Are they theories of what makes an 
action right? That would not be an accurate way to characterise virtue ethics...I doubt 
that there is anything that all three are theories of.”ii Pettit in the same volume 
disagrees with this view arguing that there are some questions for which all three 
theories provide answers. However, he also argues that Consequentialism only 
answers one question and therefore, “from the consequentialist point of view, 
Kantianism and virtue ethics may have much to teach. All that it necessarily opposes 
is any suggestion that the right option is sometimes fixed on some basis other than 
that it is the option that maximises expected value.”iii  
 
Pettit’s view then is that Consequentialism is just designed to answer the question of 
justifying the right option. Consequentialism is described as “virtual 
consequentialism”iv since it only provides an answer to this one ethical question and 
is silent on questions about how we should decide on what we ought to do, what 
motives we ought to have and what  sort of person we should try to be. Since Virtue 
Ethics and Kantian Ethics consider some of these other questions, Pettit’s suggestion 
appears to be that some sort of combination of views may therefore be possible. In the 
light of these differing interpretations, I shall start by trying to locate what could be 
taken to be the essence of these three approaches. In this way we can gain a clearer 
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idea of the choice between these three approaches and locate differences between 
them. 
 
The essences of the three approaches
To begin with , it is not possible to claim that the difference between Virtue Ethics on 
the one hand and Kantian Ethics and Consequentialism on the other is that Virtue 
Ethics is not a theory about what makes an action right. Baron is wrong to suggest 
this since Virtue Ethics does provide a characterisation of what counts as a right 
action. Hursthouse writes, “An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would 
characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances.” 
 
However, what is at issue here is not whether Virtue Ethics can provide an answer to 
the question of what makes an action right but where the different theories locate their 
essence. It might be the case that the essence of Consequentialism limits it to just 
answering the question of the justification of the right option but the essence of Virtue 
Ethics and Kantian Ethics does not necessarily imply their silence on answers to other 
ethical questions. 
 
A more profitable place to look to capture the essence of the difference between the 
three theories is rather in the question, what do they take the central ethical activity to 
be. What I have in mind here is to isolate the central activity that is necessary for the 
operation of the theory at all. In the case of Virtue Ethics, the development of a 
virtuous character is necessary before we can identify what a right action would be. 
This is evident in Hursthouse’s characterisation quoted above. In Kantian Ethics, the 
development of a good will is necessary for the performance of right actions. Kant 
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writes, “reason recognises as its highest practical function the establishment of a good 
will.”v Now, the interesting point about Consequentialism is that no such central 
activity is proposed. It is left an open question what needs to be done in order that 
outcomes be maximised. 
 
This focus on the debate suggests an alignment where Virtue Ethics and Kantian 
Ethics are grouped together in contrast to Consequentialism. This immediately shifts 
what has been taken to be the central contrast in contemporary literature between 
Virtue Ethics, on the one hand, and Kantian and Consequentialist Ethics on the other. 
The suggestion that I should like to consider is that the central activities are as follows 
: 
 Virtue Ethics: The development of a virtuous character 
 Kantian Ethics: The development of a good will 
 Consequentialist Ethics: No central activity is specified. This is an open 
question to be decided in terms of what would maximise the best outcomes. 
 
In what follows, I shall justify and elaborate these claims and then provide an 
evaluation of these theories interpreted in this way. Consequentialism will be seen to 
have very little to offer in the reduced form which captures its essence. It also cannot 
be enriched by combination with features from Virtue Ethics and Kantian Ethics as 
Pettit suggests. 
 
The evaluation of Virtue Ethics and Kantian Ethics will centre on an important 
contrast between how these theories interpret what I take to be their central ethical 
activity. Although both theories have at their centre self development in terms of a 
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good character or good will, Virtue Ethics only allows contingently for the 
recognition that others are also developing their own character. Kantian Ethics , I will 
argue, recognises this necessarily. Therefore, although my characterisation of Virtue 
Ethics and Kantian Ethics appears to leave these open to the criticism of self-
centredness, this will be shown to be a criticism that Virtue Ethics could possibly 
avoid but which Kantian Ethics necessarily does avoid. 
 
 
Consequentialism 
The essence of Consequentialism can be captured in Parfit’s characterisation of it as, 
“There is one ultimate moral aim: that outcomes be as good as possible”vi Although 
this statement of Consequentialism ties Consequentialism to a maximising form 
which it might be argued is not essential to Consequentialismvii, in all other respects it 
captures the heart of Consequentialism. Consequentialism is essentially a justificatory 
doctrine. It does not tell us explicitly what motivational doctrine we ought to adopt 
over and above the claim that it should be the motivational doctrine that will make 
outcomes as good as possible. It does not indicate whether we should consider 
individual acts separately or rules. What will justify our choice in all of these areas is 
that outcomes will be as good as possible. 
 
This interpretation of Consequentialism is justified firstly by the fact that this is what 
its leading contemporary exponents take to be its central claim. The quotation given 
in the previous paragraph was taken from Parfit’s work and Pettit also endorses this 
as the central claim of Consequentialism.viii Hare argues for its role as a justificatory 
doctrine at least at the intuitive level of moral thinking. At the critical level, he does 
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suggest applying Consequentialism to the direct evaluation of actions but only 
because this is the way that he considers outcomes will be as good as possible.ix
 
This last point highlights the second justification for the claim that Consequentialism 
is essentially a doctrine that justifies options in terms of maximising best outcomes. 
When it is applied specifically to acts, rules, motivations etc., the justification is 
always that applying it in this way will lead to outcomes being maximised. They are 
just being proposed as different vehicles that will perform this task. In other words, 
Consequentialists could all agree that their doctrine is ultimately that outcomes be as 
good as possible but disagree on how this central aim is to be achieved. In the light of 
this, we shall fail to get at the heart of the contrast between these three theories if we, 
for example, translate them all into an act formulation and then seek to compare and 
contrast them.x   An act formulation of Consequentialism does not give us the essence 
of the doctrine. 
 
Also, since different features are taken to constitute good outcomes in different 
versions of Consequentialism, contrasts which rely on one particular specification of 
a good outcome will not capture what is in common to all versions of the theory. 
Hence, accounts which try to get at the heart of the difference between these three 
approaches by taking as their starting point Act Utilitarianism will fail to reflect what 
is central to the Consequentialist approach in both of the above ways by concentrating 
on an act formulation and happiness as what has intrinsic value. 
 
If it is agreed that this captures the essence of Consequentialism, then it is apparent 
that understood in this way Consequentialism is not a complete ethical theory. To 
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provide a complete answer even to just the one ethical question of justification it will 
need to be combined with a value theory about what is good. Hence 
Consequentialism neither tells us directly how we ought to act, what motivational 
doctrine we should adopt, what sort of character we ought to develop and nor does it 
provide an account of what is to count as a good outcome. Also, in terms of this latter 
question about which it is silent, it is also silent about how we should attempt to 
justify any answer to the question of what is fundamentally of value. Considering 
Consequentialism alone, we just know that this fundamental value of goodness will 
not be justified in terms of outcomes being as good as possible. We are given no 
positive guidance about how to justify what has intrinsic goodness other than 
knowing that the justification cannot be a Consequentialist one. Consequentialist 
theories have incorporated many different positive accounts ranging from appeals to 
“intuition”xi, “larger meaning of the word ‘proof’”xii to linguistic intuitionsxiii to 
justify different claims about what has intrinsic goodness. It therefore seems to have 
very little to offer even in this reduced form. 
 
However, maybe it can be enriched, as Pettit suggests, by combining it with other 
ethical theories which provide answers to ethical questions about which 
Consequentialism is silent. What would this suggestion look like if we try to combine 
Consequentialism with Virtue Ethics? Presumably, the character that a virtuous agent 
should have would be one that would produce outcomes as good as possible. The 
strangeness of this suggestion highlights another feature of the characterisation of 
Consequentialism given above. It is essentially a doctrine about bringing something 
about - about doing rather than being. It is about promoting an end that does not exist. 
It is this feature that captures the essential strangeness of the suggestion and not the 
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fact that the virtues are being valued instrumentally. Some theories of Virtue Ethics 
take the virtues to have intrinsic value but other theories of Virtue Ethics are proposed 
where the virtues are justified as, for example, being necessary for human flourishing. 
 
To take an example of applying Consequentialism to the question of what sort of 
character the virtuous person should have, I shall consider courage. The justification 
for the virtue of courage would be that expected outcomes would be as good as 
possible if a person has the virtue of courage. However, if we consider two identical 
situations except that in one the person is courageous and in the other the person is 
foolhardy, then we can see the inadequacy of using Consequentialsim as a 
justificatory doctrine for the character that a virtuous agent should have. In both these 
situations, the two people rush to the edge of a cliff and prevent a small child from 
falling over the edge. In both cases we can assume that outcomes were as good as 
possible but that either makes the character of the person performing the action 
irrelevant or we shall be forced to the conclusion that foolhardiness is also a virtue 
like courage since outcomes are as good as possible. In other words, since outcomes 
were as good as possible that justifies the option as being the right option irrespective 
of the character of the agent.  
 
Alternatively, if outcomes being as good as possible is taken to justify the possession 
of courage as a virtue this will fail since the same argument could be used to justify 
the possession of foolhardiness. The fact that outcomes were as good as possible does 
not, in itself, indicate the presence of courageousness as opposed to foolhardiness. 
Although it might be described as courageous to save a small child from falling from 
the edge of the cliff, this does not guarantee the presence of the virtue of courage as 
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opposed to foolhardiness. As Aristotle makes clear, the performance of a virtuous 
action is a necessary condition for the existence of a virtuous state but not in itself 
sufficient. He writes in the Nicomachean Ethics, “...he who stands his ground against 
things that are terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained is brave, while the 
man who is pained is a coward.”xiv
 
So although Consequentialism is being put forward as a justificatory doctrine only, 
with the implication that it can be combined with certain aspects of other theories, the 
nature of the sort of justification proposed debars it from answering the question, 
“What sort of character would the virtuous agent have?” This question is irrelevant 
within Consequentialist theories since the focus is on outcomes to be brought about. 
 
 Pettit is also wrong when he suggests that if Consequentialism is just setting out to 
answer the question of justification then it can “feel open and uncommitted” and that 
“Consequentialists have much to learn from other approaches, not because of taking 
mistaken lines on various ethical questions, but because of not taking any line on 
those questions.”xv Ethical questions do not form some unconnected group. Questions 
about the character of agents, motivation, what I ought to do and justification are at 
least linked to the extent that answers given in one of these categories have 
implications for answers to other ethical questions. 
 
Indeed, elsewhere Pettit appears to recognise this point, at least implicitly, when he 
does recognise what is a major difference between a Consequentialist approach and a 
Virtue Ethics approach. This is that “almost all virtue ethicists presume that the point 
is to instantiate the virtues not to maximise them.”xvi This highlights that the “pick 
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and mix” approach advocated by Pettit has inherent flaws and cannot be adopted as a 
way of enriching Consequentialism. 
 
Another illustration will show the difficulty of combining Consequentialsim with 
motivational doctrines that are distinct from the motivation of producing the best 
expected outcome. Pettit argues that Consequentialsim, “allows other subjects to enter 
directly into people’s individual concerns. It allows the concerns that move people to 
motivate them independently of moralistic mediation. And it allows and encourages 
people to be spontaneous, non-calculative servants of the ends they embrace.”xvii
 
In other words, the justificatory doctrine of Consequentialism specifically encourages 
decision procedures that are not based on consequentialist calculations.It encourages 
motivations of direct concern for others, independently of viewing this as a means to 
maximise expected outcomes. However, this is not to adopt these other motivational 
doctrines and concerns in their original forms. The acceptance of these is always 
based on the claim that they will produce the best expected outcome. If they cease to 
do this, then they will be rejected. They cannot have the same intrinsic worth that is 
accorded to them from a non-Consequentialist perspective since they are ultimately 
only valued instrumentally. Although, the best expected outcome might be achieved if 
we forget that these motivational doctrines only have instrumental value, as has been 
pointed out by Parfitxviii the justification cannot be entirely forgotten. If 
Consequentialism were wholly self-effacing, then we would no longer have a 
rationale for changing motivational doctrines since the justification would have been 
entirely concealed. 
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Hence, the motivations that we have picked to combine with Consequentialism on the 
ground that they produce the best expected outcome, no longer have the intrinsic 
worth that is normally accorded to them. The skill necessary to pretend that they do, 
in order that outcomes be maximised, coupled with the knowledge that they are really 
only of instrumental value, is the sort of mental gymnastics that Consequentialsim 
requires. 
 
These two illustrations of the “pick and mix” approach suggested by Pettit highlight 
the problems with supposing that Consequentialism can just be viewed as the answer 
to the question of the justification of rightness whilst remaining uncommitted with 
respect to other ethical questions. It is an impoverished doctrine that cannot be 
enriched by taking answers from other ethical theories to the ethical questions that it 
no longer answers directly.  
 
Virtue Ethics
I suggested above that the central activity in Virtue Ethics is the development of a 
virtuous character. Each person should have as their central concern the development 
of their character. However, unlike Consequentialist Ethics, although the 
development of the agent’s own character is the central concern, Virtue Ethics does 
provide answers to other ethical questions as well. For example, adherents of Virtue 
Ethics can provide a characterisation of what counts as a right action whilst 
recognising that judgements about character are prior to judgements about the 
rightness or wrongness of actions.  
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As a starting point, I shall take the formulation, quoted earlier, that Rosalind 
Hursthouse gives of what would count as a right action in virtue ethical theories. 
Hursthouse writes, “An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would 
characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances.”xix  Now this 
formulation requires some careful examination. First, as it stands it would not appear 
to be a necessary condition of the rightness of an action that it is performed by a 
virtuous agent. This is because Hursthouse talks about what a virtuous agent would  
characteristically do. Therefore, to return to an example earlier in the paper, a 
foolhardy person could rescue the small child from the edge of the cliff and thereby 
perform a right action since it is the action that the courageous person would 
characteristically do.  
 
In general then, irrespective of an agent’s character, if an agent performs an act that 
would be the act that a virtuous agent would perform if acting in character, then this 
would be the right action. However, this is surely to miss the central point of a Virtue 
Ethics theory which is that what makes an action right is that it is done by a virtuous 
agent. To take another example, we have two cases in each of which an agent helps 
an elderly person across the road. This might be what a benevolent agent would do in 
these sorts of circumstances if acting in character but if one of these agents is not a 
benevolent agent then the action will not be the right action. In other words, we might 
superficially have the same action being performed but this would not be the case if 
one of the agents is a virtuous agent and the other is not. 
 
So a reformulation of Hursthouse’s position is necessary to remove this ambiguity. 
Perhaps the following will capture what is distinctive of what will count as a right 
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action within Virtue Ethics. A necessary and sufficient condition of an action being 
right is that it be performed by a virtuous agent acting in character This formulation 
has removed the possibility that there could be an extensional equivalence between 
actions performed by virtuous agents and actions performed by agents who lack the 
virtues but who act as a virtuous agent would if acting in character. 
 
However, it is possible that this second formulation is also ambiguous. Michael Slote 
considers that there can be two different versions of Virtue Ethics depending on how 
we interpret the above formulation. We could either be saying that virtuous agents are 
able to perceive or are sensitive to something in actions that makes them right. That 
is, there are features that make an action right and virtuous agents perceive these 
features. Alternatively, one could argue that what makes the action right is not these 
features but the fact that the virtuous agent, acting in character, chose this action as 
the right action. It is this choosing that constitutes the rightness of the action. He calls 
the former an act-based Virtue Ethics and the latter agent-based. Slote writes of 
agent-based Virtue Ethics that, “It must derive its evaluations of human actions, 
whether aretaic or deontic, from independent and fundamental aretaic 
characterisations of the inner traits or motives of individuals or of the individuals 
themselves”  xx
 
In both these versions of Virtue Ethics, the character of the virtuous agent is still 
primary. The virtuous character in choosing makes the action right or the virtuous 
character is sensitive to features in the situation that make the action right. In both 
cases, the primary aim will be for the agent to develop a virtuous character. This 
 13
virtuous character will either in itself make the actions she performs right or will 
enable her to perceive features in a situation that make an action right. 
 
Kantian Ethics
Like Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics is also able to answer the question of what makes 
an action right whilst still taking as the central activity the development of a good 
will. This might seem an obvious claim to those who take Kant’s primary concern to 
be the evaluation of actions. However, recent interpretations have argued against this 
traditional interpretation. In what follows, I shall be providing my own justification of 
the centrality of the development of a good will in Kant’s ethics rather than the 
evaluation of actions. However, like Virtue ethics, this does not preclude a Kantian 
answer to the question of what makes an action right.  
 
Kant starts the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals  with the claim that the only 
thing that has intrinsic goodness is a good will. He writes, “There is no possibility of 
thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as 
good without qualification, except a good will”xxi
 
This good will is developed by acting on maxims that can pass the test given by Kant 
in the Categorical Imperative, “I should never act except in such a way that I can also 
will that my maxim should become a universal law.”xxii Hence we have an account of 
what actions to perform, at least to the extent of a test for any proposed maxims that 
we might put forward. Acting in this way is how Kant understands the virtuous agent. 
He writes, “Now the capacity and considered resolve to withstand a strong but unjust 
opponent is fortitude (fortitudo)  and, with respect to what opposes the moral 
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disposition within us, virtue (virtus, fortitudo moralis). So the part of the general 
doctrine of duties that brings inner, rather than outer, freedom under laws is a 
doctrine of virtue. “xxiii
 
The virtuous agent is one who acts as closely as possible to the good will by 
overcoming inclinations and acting on maxims that can become universal laws. The 
fact that the good will and virtue are defined with respect to the moral law, does not 
invalidate the claim that Kant’s central ethical activity is the development of a good 
will. Just as there are standard versions of virtue ethics that do not take the virtues to 
have intrinsic value but rather ground the virtues in the idea of human flourishing, so 
a virtuous character can be explained in terms of the requirements of the moral law. 
 
Where this suggestion does sound strange is if it is taken as axiomatic that virtue 
ethics should contain no reference to rules or laws or principles but instead rely on 
notions of sensitivity that cannot be unpacked in terms of rule following. However, 
this claim can be attacked on at least two grounds. First, there are exponents of virtue 
ethics who argue for principles within virtue ethics. For example, Hursthouse claims, 
“that virtue ethics not only comes up with rules (the v-rules, couched in terms derived 
from the virtues and vices), but further, does not exclude the more familiar 
deontologists’ rules.”xxiv  The first sort of rules will be of the sort, ‘Act charitably’, 
‘Do not act dishonestly” and the second sort would be, ‘Do not tell a lie’. This second 
sort would be backed up by an appeal to a virtue or vice. In the case of the example 
given, the reason that you must not tell a lie is because it would be dishonest. 
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The second ground for attacking this claim is that the opposition between virtue ethics 
and rules is often based on a view of rules as algorithms for providing an account of 
what is right. McDowell seems to implicitly make this move when he argues for the 
non-reduction of the sensitivity of the virtuous person to a list of rules. He writes, “If 
one attempted to reduce one’s conception of what virtue requires to a set of rules, 
then, however subtle and thoughtful one was in drawing up the code, cases would 
inevitably turn up in which a mechanical application of the rules would strike one as 
wrong - and not necessarily because one had changed one’s mind; rather, one’s mind 
on the matter was not susceptible of capture in any universal formula.”xxv
 
Now it is not necessary to hold this conception of rules and it is at least arguable that 
Kant did not take rules in this way. In the Metaphysics of Morals  Kant specifically 
denies this rote application of rules when he examines cases of conflict. In such cases, 
we do not say that both rules apply but we recognise that there are conflicting grounds 
and that judgement is required to see which applies.xxvi This is made more specific 
when he considers the casuistical questions where it becomes clear that the rules or 
principles supply guidelines rather than algorithms and require judgement for 
interpretation. Kant writes, “Is it murdering oneself to hurl oneself to certain death 
(like Curtius) in order to save one’s country? Or is deliberate martyrdom, sacrificing 
oneself for the good of all mankind, also to be considered an act of heroism?”xxvii
 
Virtue Ethics or Kantian Ethics
If then we accept that both Virtue Ethics and Kantian Ethics are more wide ranging 
than Consequentialism and that both start from a position where the central activity is 
some sort of development of the agent, which is to be preferred as an approach to 
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ethical questions? If the central activity is taken to be some sort of concern by the 
agent for her character or good will, are there compelling grounds for adopting a 
virtue ethics approach as opposed to a Kantian approach? 
 
I shall argue that there is at least one ground for preferring Kantian Ethics which 
becomes evident when considering a common criticism that can be made to both 
Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics as I have characterised them. The criticism is that so 
characterised they are open to the self-centredness objection. If we are to keep our 
own character development or the development of a good will at the centre of ethical 
concern, isn’t  this unjustifiably self-centred. Shouldn’t concern for others figure in a 
moral theory? 
 
Now, it is important to be clear about the precise nature of this objection. For 
example, it should not be conflated with the claim made by Solomon that, “This 
asymmetry between my attitude towards my own character and my attitude towards 
the character of others is, it seems to me, ineliminable within virtue ethics."xxviii  
Solomon extends this point to Kantian Ethics and takes it to imply the self-
centredness objection. Now, while I agree that in the case of both Kantian Ethics and 
Virtue Ethics, as I have described them, there is an asymmetry in my attitude towards 
my own character and my attitude towards the character of others, this can be 
accepted without accepting that Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics are open to the self-
centredness objection. From the claim that a different attitude is taken to my own 
character it does not follow that too much attention is being paid to our own character 
development. 
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I shall argue that whilst agreeing with Solomon that there is this “ineliminable” 
asymmetry in attitude this does not imply the self-centredness objection in the case of 
Kantian Ethics since this theory necessarily incorporates the recognition that others 
are also developing a good will. In the case of Virtue Ethics, this recognition of the 
character development of others is contingent and thus Virtue Ethics can be liable to 
the self-centredness objection. 
 
To begin with, it is important to note, as Solomon remarks, that the charge of self-
centredness cannot be answered by pointing to the fact that I shall be acquiring other-
regarding virtues as well as self-regarding virtues. This still does not incorporate a 
concern for other agent’s character development in the same way as I have a concern 
for my own character development. The fact that I might acquire the virtues of 
kindness or justice might ensure that I treat others in this way but to exhibit kindness 
to someone is not the same as being concerned to develop that virtue, for example, in 
their character. 
 
However, Kant is suggesting something more than this. To understand this, it is 
necessary to remember that Kant puts forward two obligatory ends which he calls 
duties of virtue.xxix These are distinguished from ends that we might have 
contingently and they are the duties of self perfection and the duty to seek the 
happiness of others. Kant explicitly denies that we have a duty to make another 
person’s perfection our end and also denies that we have a duty of happiness to 
ourselves. In the latter case, we do not have a duty to promote our own happiness 
because what we already want cannot be a duty. In the former case, we cannot have a 
duty to seek another person’s perfection because this is something that is under the 
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autonomous control of each agent. It is under the control of each agent to set her own 
goals rather than have someone else set them for her. 
 
Now, this supports Solomon’s position that Kant is advocating a different attitude to 
self perfection than to other’s perfection. Indeed, Solomon brings forward this precise 
evidence to support his claim that Kantian Ethics shares the same asymmetry that 
Virtue Ethics does. However, this misses the fundamental point about the Kantian 
doctrine because the recognition that other agents are also embarked on the task of the 
cultivation of a good will is essential to an understanding of Kantian Ethics. In this 
respect, then, the different attitude does not imply that too much attention is being 
paid to self-development. The acceptance of the different attitude does not make 
Kantian Ethics liable to the self-centredness objection. 
 
To understand this point it is necessary to explain precisely how to understand this 
asymmetry between my attitude to my own character and my attitude to the character 
of others. In both Virtue Ethics and Kantian Ethics there is a different attitude to self 
development than to that same development in others. Virtue Ethics, has as its 
essence the development of the individual’s own character and there is no essential 
mention of others in this development. Others figure just as the recipients of the 
other-regarding virtues that I acquire . In contrast, on a Kantian account although the 
duty of perfection is limited to the self, there is also essentially the recognition that 
other human beings are also seeking their own perfection. The recognition of this 
generates certain duties that I owe to others. These are duties that incorporate my 
recognition that they are also agents who are setting their own ends and seeking to 
develop their own good will. Negative duties not to obstruct them in this task and also 
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positive duties of assistance are thus generated in virtue of this recognition of them as 
agents with ends. This is not an optional extra on the Kantian account since the 
development of the agent’s own good will has  to be considered alongside the 
constraints implicit in the recognition that others are also developing their own good 
will. 
 
The key then to understanding this asymmetry and recognising that it does not imply 
the self-centredness objection in the case of Kantian Ethics although it could in the 
case of Virtue Ethics can be seen in the following example about Christian love taken 
from Solomon’s article. If we consider that the acquisition of Christian love is a virtue 
then this “requires me to attend to the wants, needs and desires of others. But doesn’t 
this suggest that I regard others as less morally important than myself? Satisfying 
their needs is good enough for them, but I require of myself that I become a loving 
person.”xxx There is no recognition in my attitude that they are also agents embarked 
on the task of acquiring virtues. They are just viewed as recipients of my loving and 
kind Christian virtue. 
 
In contrast, in the Kantian account although there is an asymmetry in the sense that I 
do not have the same attitude to the development of good will of others as I do to the 
development of my own, there is built in the recognition that others are also embarked 
on this task and this generates obligations within me. The  self -centredness objection 
which can apply to Virtue Ethics cannot apply to Kantian Ethics. 
 
My argument is that the recognition that others are also developing a good will is 
necessary to Kantian Ethics but the recognition that others are also developing a 
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virtuous character is, at best, only contingently present in Virtue Ethics. There is 
nothing necessary in my development of a virtuous character that requires that I take 
into account that others are also embarked on this task. In contrast, within Kantian 
Ethics the development of a good will cannot be explained in isolation from the fact 
that others are also developing a good will. 
 
Now, even if the above is accepted it might be argued that there are other points that 
could be put forward to support a Virtue Ethics approach as opposed to a Kantian 
approach. One that was hinted at during the course of the paper was the incorporation 
within Kantian Ethics of principles or rules which might be deemed objectionable by 
supporters of certain forms of Virtue Ethics. I have not time to debate the merits of 
the debate between Virtue Ethics and Kantian Ethics on other fronts. However, I think 
that a case can be made for the central importance of the point that I have discussed. 
In an ethical theory, concern for others must go beyond just viewing them as 
recipients of our other-regarding virtues. Their development must be considered hand 
in hand with our own. Therefore, if the characterisation that I have given of the 
central activity of Virtue Ethics is accepted, this criticism of the approach strikes at 
the very essence of the theory. 
 
Conclusion
The opposition between Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics and Consequentialism as 
described in much contemporary literature has been shown to be misplaced. Virtue 
Ethics has been taken to be in opposition to Kantian Ethics and Consequentialism 
because of its concentration on character development rather than the Kantian or 
Consequentialist’s concentration on what makes an action right. 
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 I have argued that this is not the correct way to describe those theories. 
Consequentialism is essentially just a doctrine about what justifies the right option 
and cannot “pick and mix” from other ethical theories to provide answers to other 
ethical questions. Both Kantian and Virtue Ethics have the development of the agent 
as their focus whilst still providing answers to the question of what makes an action 
right. However, to avoid the charge of self-centredness, an ethical theory needs to be 
developed that essentially incorporates the recognition that others are also, as moral 
agents, embarked on the task of moral self perfection. Kantian Ethics does this and 
this is one reason to prefer Kantian Ethics to Virtue Ethics. 
 
Dr. Jane Singleton 
Principal Lecturer in Philosophy 
University of Hertfordshire 
September 1999 
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